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NOTES
A LIBELALIZATION OF THE USE OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY IN ILLINOIS-- WILSON v. CLARK
Historically, common law' standards restricted the use and presentation
of expert testimony in the courtroom2 by limiting the number of subjects
about which the expert could testify.' The expert was required to base his
opinion only upon facts which were admitted or, at a minimum, admissible
into evidence." The rationale underlying this requirement was that if the
1. For the purposes of this Note, common law refers to the fundamental principles which
once governed the use of expert testimony. For a complete discussion of the history of expert
testimony and the development of the rules which governed it, see Hand, Historical and Prac-
tical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1901).
2. One commentator has noted that "[in respect to admissible expert opinion, a body of
rules has grown up involving techniques and skills almost equalling in complexity the subject
matter about which the expert testimony is given." Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV.
414, 417 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Ladd].
3. To warrant the use of expert testimony, the subject or inference had to "be so distinc-
tively related to some science, profession, business, or occupation as to be beyond the ken of
the average layman." C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 13, at 29 (2d ed.
1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]. Illinois courts are not this restrictive, and expert
testimony involving matters of common knowledge is allowed if such testimony will assist the
jury in reaching an understanding of the subject matter. See Thompson v. Hughes, 286 Ill.
128, 121 N.E. 387 (1918) (test is whether special knowledge and experience aid jury); Jamison
v. Lambke, 21 111. App. 3d 629, 316 N.E.2d 93 (1st Dist. 1974) (expert testimony is admissible
if it would aid the triers of fact, even if they might have a general knowledge of the subject
matter); Carlson v. Hudson, 19 Ill. App. 3d 576, 312 N.E.2d 19 (3d Dist. 1974) (rule barring
use of expert testimony as to matters of common knowledge is not inflexible, and the trend in
situations where the matter is difficult to comprehend and explain is to permit expert testimony
to be received at discretion of trial court if'it assists the jury in coming to an understanding);
Stanley v. Board of Educ., 9 Ill. App. 3d 963, 293 N.E.2d 417 (1st Dist. 1973) (the better rule
would give a trial judge a wide area of discretion in permitting expert testimony which would
aid the triers of fact in their understanding of the issues even though they might have general
knowledge of the subject matter); Mack v. Davis, 76 I1. App. 2d 88, 221 N.E.2d 121 (2d Dist.
1966) (the trend is to permit expert testimony even as to matters of common knowledge and
understanding where difficult to explain or comprehend without the aid of an expert) (citing
Miller v. Pillsbury Co., 33 Ill. 2d 514, 516-17, 211 N.E.2d 733, 734 (1965)). For a general
statement of the test for admissibility of expert testimony, see WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1923
(3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence rejects the common law limitation of subjects
upon which an expert may give testimony and provides for the admission of expert testimony
if it assists the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining the facts in issue.
FED. R. EvID. 702.
4. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 15, at 34. See Schwartz v. People's Gas, Light & Coke
Co., 35 Ill. App. 2d 25, 33, 181 N.E.2d 826, 830 (1st Dist. 1962) (expert's opinion on defective
condition inadmissible where assumption is made on facts not in evidence); Kanne v.
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trier of fact was unaware of the data upon which the expert's opinion was
based, he could not evaluate the reliability of the expert's testimony.' An
expert's opinion based on matters not in evidence was considered inadmissi-
ble hearsay6 because the non-evidentiary data forming the basis of the opi-
nion was not subject to the ordinary tests for ascertaining the truth.7 Conse-
quently, substantial time and effort were wasted during trial in presenting
various witnesses whose sole purpose was to place certain data into evidence
in order to construct a sufficient foundation for the expert's opinion.,
Moreover, because the expert could not resolve disputed facts, expert opin-
ions could only be elicited in response to a hypothetical question.' Because
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 310 II1. App. 524, 530, 34 N.E.2d 732, 735 (1st Dist. 1941)
(expert's opinion allowed only if based upon and supported by facts in evidence). See generally
H. CLARK, CALLAGHAN'S ILLINOIS EVIDENCE §§ 7.45, 7.69 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
CALLAGHAN]; E. CLEARY. HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE § 11.9, at 189 (2d ed. 1963)
[hereinafter cited as CLEARY]; S. GARD, ILLINOIS EVIDENCE MANUAL, Rules 221, 222, 223 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as GARD].
Similarly, courts have held that an expert's opinion must not be guess or conjecture. See,
e.g., Marshall v. First Am. Nat'l Bank, 91 111. App. 2d 47, 53, 233 N.E.2d 430, 433 (5th Dist.
1968) (quoting Kanne v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 310 Ill. App. 524, 530, 34 N.E.2d 732,
735 (1st Dist. 1941)). Other courts have held that an expert's opinion must not be based on the
opinion of another expert. See, e.g., Stancill v. McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc., 497 F.2d 529, 536
(5th Cir. 1974); Harris v. Smith, 372 F.2d 806, 812 (8th Cir. 1967). But see, People v. Noble,
42 Ill. 2d 425, 436, 248 N.E.2d 96, 102 (1969) (psychiatrist may base opinion on tests ad-
ministered by psychologist he hired).
Finally, the expert's opinion must not invade the province of the jury. See, e.g., Gillette v.
Chicago, 396 Il1. 619, 626, 72 N.E.2d 326, 329 (1947); Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v.
Continental Can Co., 308 Ill. 242, 245, 139 N.E. 395, 396 (1923). While these cases prohibited
an expert opinion on an ultimate issue, recent Illinois decisions clearly allow such testimony.
See, e.g., Merchant Nat'l Bank v. Elgin, J. & E. R.R., 49 Ill. 2d 118, 122, 273 N.E.2d 809,
811 (1971) (because the trier of fact is not required to accept the expert's opinion, the opinion
does not usurp the province of the jury). Accord Clifford-Jacobs Forging Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 19 Ill. 2d 236, 243, 166 N.E.2d 582, 586 (1960).
5. See Spector, People v. Ward: Toward a Reconstruction of Expert Testimony in Illinois,
26 DEPAUL L. REV. 284, 285 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Spector]. See generally MCCORMICK,
supra note 3, § 15, at 34-36.
6. See MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 15, at 34; J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE 703[021, at 703-9 (1978) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN]. McCormick assails this
reasoning because "almost all expert opinion embodies hearsay indirectly, a matter which the
courts often recognize and accept." MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 15, at 36. See also WIGMORE,
supra note 3, § 665(b); Spector, supra note 5, at 285.
7. For example, the author of the material relied upon by the witness is not exposed to
cross-examination. Additionally, the court and jury are not afforded an opportunity to observe
the author's character and demeanor on the witness stand. 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 493, at
552 (1967).
8. Spector, supra note 5, at 285.
9. The hypothetical question is used "to prevent experts from implicitly testifying to the
truth of facts on which they have no firsthand information." McElhaney, Expert Witnesses
and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 MERCER L. REV. 463, 472 n.45 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as McElhaney]. See Economy Light & Power Co. v. Sheridan', 200 Ill. 439, 441, 65 N.E. 1070,
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this rule was based upon a concern with admissibility rather than with the
discovery of truth, it often prevented disclosure of facts necessary to reach
a just solution to the case.10
Contemporary trials often present highly technical information to juries
composed of lay people." Evaluation of this highly technical evidence
forms an integral part of the basis of 4 jury's verdict. Expert testimony,
therefore, has become increasingly necessary to aid the jury in drawing
reasonable conclusions from technical information.'" The Illinois Supreme
Court, in Wilson v. Clark," recently adopted two federal rules of evidence
which liberalized the trial procedures controlling expert testimony. In
Wilson, the court explicitly adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 703," govern-
ing the permissible bases of an expert's opinion, and Rule 705,'1 governing
the disclosure of information underlying an expert's opinion. As a result of
the Wilson decision, Illinois now adheres to a more practical approach con-
cerning the use of expert testimony.
In order to assess the probable effect of these newly adopted rules in Il-
linois, the mechanics of each rule are discussed. The two federal rules are
then compared with the Illinois trial procedures that previously governed
the permissible bases for expert opinions and the mode for introducing ex-
pert testimony. Additionally, problems raised by the adoption of these rules
are discussed and solutions are suggested.
1071 (1902) (hypothetical question must leave the jury free to determine for themselves the
truth or falsity of facts assumed); Ryan v. Blakey, 71 111. App. 3d 339, 350, 389 N.E.2d 604,
612 (5th Dist. 1979) (witness may not decide any controverted fact in issue, but must accept
only the assumed facts); Netcher v. Bernstein, 110 Ill. App. 484, 487-88 (1st Dist. 1903)
(hypothetical question must be based on assumed facts).
10. See Rheingold, The Basis of Medical Testimony, 15 VAND. L. REV. 473, 475 (1962)
[hereinafter cited Rheingold]. The author states:
Rules of evidence, developed years ago and applicable supposedly to all witnesses
absorbed with questions of admissibility and not with proof, persuasion and the
discovery of truth are being imposed in many jurisdictions to prevent free and full
use of basic facts necessary to reach a correct and just solution of a case involving
a medical issue.
11. ILLINOIS INST. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, ILL. CIVIL TRIAL EVIDENCE § 5.14
(1971).
12. Id. § 5.15. Chief Justice Burger, when sitting on the Circuit Court of Appeals, cogently
stated the reasons courts allow expert opinions into evidence:
Opinion testimony is one of those practical anomalies of the law of evidence devis-
ed to help a jury of laymen understand technical subjects on which they would be
required to speculate or guess without some expert explanation. Expert opinion is
used on the theory that the subject cannot be made clear to lay jurors in any other
way. The opinion testimony so admitted presumably bears on the issue which the
jury must decide, and hence, the opinion may well have substantial persuasive ef-
fect on the jury, provided they consider the expert trustworthy.
Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Burger, J., concurring).
13. 84 111. 2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (1981).
14. FED. R. EvID. 703.
15. FED. R. EVID. 705.
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Rule 703
Bases of Opinion Testimony By Experts
Essentially, the basis of an expert's opinion is the underlying information
he relies upon to reach a conclusion. Rule 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at
or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the
facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. 7
Incorporated into this rule are three sources of information upon which the
opinion of an expert may properly rest.' 8 The first source consists of facts
or data perceived by the expert prior to trial. This source refers to the ex-
pert's personal observations,' 9 such as the objective findings of a treating
physician.20
The second source of expert opinions derives from information made
known to the expert at trial.' The hypothetical question is the primary
technique used to inform the expert of relevant facts introduced at trial.22
This procedure requires the expert to base his opinion upon data supported
16. See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL Rule 703, at
425-27 (2d ed. 1977); WEINSTEIN, supra note 6, 703[01], at 703-4.
17. FED. R. EVID. 703.
18. See FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee note.
19. See id. See also Gibbons, Rules 701-706." Opinions and Expert Testimony, 57 CHI. B.
REC. 224, 225 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Gibbons].
20. See Rheingold, supra note 10, at 488-89. A distinction must be drawn between whether
the patient's symptoms are subjective or objective. In general, subjective symptoms are those
which must be related by the patient to the doctor, for they cannot be observed. Objective
symptoms, on the other hand, are those detectable only within the independent knowledge of
the doctor. Id. at 489 n. 97. In Illinois, a testifying physician can only testify to objective
symptoms unless a hypothetical question is used. People v. Hester, 39 Ill. 2d 489, 510, 237
N.E.2d 466, 479 (1968). This distinction between objective and subjective symptoms has led to
some irreconcilable cases. For example, although an inability to flex a finger muscle has been
held to be a subjective symptom, Barnes v. Chicago City Ry., 147 Ill. App. 601, 603 (lst Dist.
1909), the flexing of the knees and feet has been held to be objective. Hirsch v. Chicago Con-
sol. Traction Co., 146 Ill. App. 501, 505-06 (1st Dist. 1909).
21. FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee note.
22. Id. Prior to the Wilson decision, the hypothetical question was the required mode for
eliciting an expert's opinion if the expert did not testify from personal knowledge. See, e.g.,
City of Decatur v. Fisher, 63 111. 241, 243 (1872) (where facts not personally known to expert
are in conflict, required procedure is for expert to give opinion based on hypothetical question
containing an assumed set of facts); Borowski v. Von Solbrig, 14 Il1. App. 3d 672, 686-87, 303
N.E.2d 146, 156-57 (1st Dist. 1974), aff'd, 60 I1. 2d 418, 328 N.E.2d 301 (1975) (courts have
universally required the use of a hypothetical question in order to allow an expert to express
his opinion where the premise upon which he bases his opinion is not supplied by the witness
himself from his own observation); Sherman v. City of Springfield, 77 Il. App. 2d 195, 214,
222 N.E.2d 62, 72 (1966) (where personal observation is lacking, a hypothetical question must
be used).
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by the evidence adduced or upon the assumption that certain testimony
elicited is true.23 Alternatively, the expert witness may attend the trial and
base his opinion on testimony heard in court.2"
Finally, the rule permits the expert to rely on information made known to
him outside the courtroom by means other than his own perceptions." This
is perhaps the most far-reaching and controversial provision of the rule.1
6
Under this provision, extrajudicial information need not be technically ad-
missible into evidence if it is of a type reasonably relied upon-by experts in
forming opinions regarding their particular fields of specialty.27 This ex-
pands the scope of the bases of expert opinions beyond the common law
standard which permitted the expert to testify only after the proper founda-
tion had been laid. 8 Accordingly, judicial procedure is brought into line
with the practice of experts outside the court.29
23. See, e.g., Pritchett v. Steinker Trucking Co., 108 Ill. App. 2d 371, 376, 247 N.E.2d
923, 926 (4th Dist. 1969) (opinion of expert must be based upon evidentiary facts in record);
Lake Erie & Western R.R. v. Delong, 109 Ill. App. 241, 244 (3d Dist. 1903) (question may
assume any fact which evidence tends to establish).
24. FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee note. An imperfection with the trial observation
technique is the difficulty of determining which segments of the evidence constitute the bases
for the expert's opinion, especially in cases where the evidence is conflicting. The advisory
committee note addresses this, stating "[p]roblems of determining what testimony the expert
relied upon when ...the testimony is in conflict may be resolved by resort to Rule 705."
Under Rule 705, the judge may require an expert to disclose the underlying bases of his opin-
ion. This will probably not be necessary, however, because for reasons of persuasion and
credibility the trial attorney initially elicits from the "trial observing" expert all the facts or
data that the expert has obtained from the hearing, which, in turn, are used to form the ex-
pert's opinion. J. CROTCHETr & A. ELKIND, FEDERAL COURTROOM EVIDENCE 114 (1976).
25. FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee note.
26. Opinions based on non-admissible evidence were ordinarily inadmissible due to hearsay
objections. WEINSTEIN, supra note 6, 703[02], at 703-9. Those who opposed allowing an ex-
pert to rely upon facts or data made known to him out of court primarily feared that this
would "open too wide a door to the receiving of unreliable testimony and prevent effective
cross-examination as to the validity of the underlying data." Id. (quoting Assoc. of the Bar of
the City of N.Y. Comm. on the Fed. Courts, Report with Respect to the Proposed Fed. R. of
Evid. for the United States Dist. Courts and Magistrates 68 (May 28, 1970)). See Hearings on
Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminal
Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 231-33 (1973) (letter from
Malcolm T. Dungan, Esq. to Rep. Hungate, criticizing Rule 703 and suggesting a substitute
provision); Project of a Comm. of N.Y. Trial Lawyers, Recommendation & Study Relating to
the Advisory Comm.'s Preliminary Draft of the Proposed Fed. R. Evid. at 204 (June 1, 1970)
("[p]roposed Rule 703 makes an unwarranted intrusion into the province of the hearsay rule").
27. FED. R. EvID. 703.
28. FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee note.
29. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee note. Using the example of the physician, the ad-
visory committee reasoned:
IA] physician in his own practice bases his diagnosis on information from numerous
sources and of considerable variety, including statements by patients and relatives,
reports and opinions from nurses, technicians and other doctors, hospital records
and x-rays. Most of them are admissible in evidence, but only with the expenditure
of substantial time in producing and examining various authenticating witnesses.
The physician makes life and death decisions in reliance upon them. His valida-
19821
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
Expert opinions based on evidence not admitted at trial were ordinarily
considered inadmissible under Illinois law." The Illinois Supreme Court,
however, reconsidered the scope of this limitation on expert testimony in
People v. Ward.' In Ward, the court allowed a psychiatrist's opinion
testimony concerning the defendant's sanity to be based upon information
not in evidence. 2 Although the court discussed Rule 703 favorably, it did
not specifically adopt the rule.3 3 Consequently, prior to Wilson, the scope
of the supreme court's holding was arguably limited to cases involving fac-
tual situations similar to those present in Ward."
Rule 705
Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert Opinion
Traditionally, Illinois law has prohibited an expert from testifying at trial
without prior courtroom disclosure of the information underlying his opinion. 35
tion, expertly performed and subject to cross-examination, ought to suffice for
judicial purposes.
Id. (emphasis added).
30. See, e.g., Pritchett v. Steinker Trucking Co., 108 I11. App. 2d 371, 376, 247 N.E.2d
923, 926 (4th Dist. 1969) (expert's opinion inadmissible if not based upon evidentiary facts in
record); Wallace v. Yudelson, 244 Ill. App. 320, 329 (1st Dist. 1927) (expert opinion which
assumes facts not based on evidence is so speculative that it is not proper or competent to be
considered by the jury).
31. 61 111. 2d 559, 338 N.E.2d 171 (1975).
32. Id. at 563-65, 338 N.E.2d at 174-75. The trial court had admitted a psychiatrist's opin-
ion which was based on psychological test results compiled by a psychologist, a psychiatric ex-
amination performed by another psychiatrist, and reports concerning the defendant's behavior
while he was a patient of other institutions. None of these reports had been admitted into
evidence. Id.
33. Id. at 567-68, 338 N.E.2d at 176. The Ward decision referred to Federal Rule of
Evidence 703 as buttressing the desirability of allowing expert medical opinion as to sanity based
in part on records not admitted into evidence. Id. Thus, the court did not specifically adopt
Rule 703 as controlling in all cases in which expert testimony is offered.
34. For example, the psychiatrist in Ward relied upon data that would have been admissi-
ble if it had been offered into evidence by the witnesses who compiled the reports. Thus, Ward
could be interpreted as merely holding that an expert's opinion is admissible when the opinion
is based on data which would have been admissible if properly offered and if the defendant
failed to make a timely objection. For a discussion of the Ward decision, see Spector, supra
note 5, at 286 n.14.
In Ward, the psychiatrist relied upon a report that was written under his direction and su-
pervision. Thus, cross-examination as to the results of the report was available to the defen-
dant. Subsequent decisions, however, have applied the principle stated in Ward to psychiatric
reports which were relied upon by the expert witness, although the reports were not compiled
under the witness' direction and supervision. See, e.g., Clemons v. Alton & Southern R.R., 56
Ill. App. 3d 328, 337-38, 370 N.E.2d 679, 686 (5th Dist. 1978) (surgeon's opinion admissible
though based in part on psychiatrist's report).
35. Prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data upon which the expert relied in forming
his opinion was required as a safeguard of reliability. See People v. Driver, 62 Ill. App. 3d
847, 853, 379 N.E.2d 840, 846 (4th Dist. 1978) (expert opinion excluded where expert did not
testify to facts upon which his conclusion was based); People v. O'Neal, 118 Ill. App. 2d 116,
122-23, 254 N.E.2d 559, 562 (2d Dist. 1969) (ballistics expert's opinion admissible where expert
Vol. 31:387
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If the expert had personal knowledge of the subject matter about which he
would testify, he would first testify to his observations and then proffer his
opinion.36 If the expert's testimony merely involved interpreting data and
drawing conclusions, the required mode for eliciting his opinion testimony
was the hypothetical question.37
Within a hypothetical question, all undisputed facts that are material to
the expert's opinion must be recited.3" In addition, the witness must accept
as true every fact which is hypothetically presented because the witness can-
not determine the validity of controverted facts.3 Finally, each fact included
within the hypothetical question must be derived from evidence already ad-
duced at trial."0 The court has discretion to permit an expert witness to
answer a hypothetical question based upon facts not yet admitted into
set forth reasons for his conclusion). See generally 4 CALLAGHAN, supra note 4, § 7.71 (1964);
CLEARY, supra note 4, §. 11.9; GARD, supra note 4, Rules 220, 221, 223.
36. See City of Chicago v. Central Nat'l Bank, 5 Ill. 2d 164, 125 N.E.2d 94 (1955); In re
Barrie's Will, 393 Ill. 111, 65 N.E.2d 433 (1946). See also GARD, supra note 4, § 7.11.
37. See, e.g., City of Decatur v. Fisher, 63 Ill. 241, 242-43 (1872) (where all or some of the
facts not personally known to the expert are in conflict, the required procedure is to give an
opinion to a hypothetical question containing an assumed statement of facts). Borowski v. Von
Solbrig, 14 Ill. App. 3d 672, 686-87, 303 N.E.2d 146, 156-57 (1st Dist. 1974) (courts have
universally required the use of a hypothetical question in order to allow an expert to express an
opinion where the expert fails to base an opinion on his or her own observations), aff'd, 60 Ill.
2d 418, 328 N.E.2d 301 (1975); Sherman v. City of Springfield, 77 Ill. App. 2d 195, 214, 222
N.E.2d 62, 72 (4th Dist. 1966) (where personal observation is lacking, hypothetical question
must be used); Spring Valley Coal Co. v. McCarthy, 136 Ill. App. 473, 477 (1907) (proper way
to examine an expert who is not acquainted with the facts is to pose hypothetical question em-
bodying the facts). For a discussion of the hypothetical question, see generally CLEARY, supra
note 4, § 11.9; GARD, supra note 4, Rules 220, 221, 223.
38. See Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. Industrial Comm'n, 343 Ill. 236, 243, 175 N.E. 372,
375 (1931) (question is to include all facts which evidence tends to prove and all facts which
are not in dispute); Ryan v. Blakey, 71 Ill. App. 3d 339, 350, 389 N.E.2d 604, 612 (5th Dist.
1979) (hypothetical question should incorporate all undisputed facts in evidence which are relevant
and material to the issue); Lange v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 105 Ill. App. 2d 99,
110, 245 N.E.2d 35, 40 (1st Dist.) (where the evidence is undisputed, the hypothetical question
must contain all facts and must not ignore material facts which would affect the opinion of the
expert witness), rev'd on other grounds, 44 11. 2d 73, 254 N.E.2d 467 (1969). This rule is
derived from the fear that the jury will be misled by the expert's opinion if the hypothetical
fails to contain all relevant, undisputed facts. See Christianson v. City of Chicago Heights, 103
Ill. App. 2d 315, 322, 243 N.E.2d 677, 688 (1st Dist. 1968).
39. Clifford-Jacobs Forging Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Ill. 2d 236, 243, 166 N.E.2d
582, 587 (1960). See also Ryan v. Blakey, 71 111. App. 3d 339, 350, 389 N.E.2d 604, 612 (5th
Dist. 1979) (witness may not decide any controverted fact in issue, but must accept only the
assumed facts); Netcher v. Bernstein, 110 Ill. App. 484, 487 (1903) (witness must assume truth
of facts hypothecated).
40. See Piacentini v. Bonnefil, 69 Ill. App. 2d 433, 441, 217 N.E.2d 507, 511 (1st Dist.
1966) (hypothetical question properly rejected where it assumes fact not in evidence); Botwinis
v. Allgood, 113 Ill. App. 188, 193-94 (3d Dist. 1903). But see People v. Yonder, 44 Ill. 2d 376,
385, 256 N.E.2d 321, 326 (1969) (hypothetical question may include only proven facts), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 975 (1970). Cf. Gus T. Handge & Son Painting Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 33
Ill. 2d 201, 206, 210 N.E.2d 498, 501 (1965) (hypothetical question need only contain elements
which support propounding party's theory of the case and of which there is some evidence).
1982]
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evidence when there is a representation by counsel that evidence supporting
the assumed facts will be subsequently produced. This practice, however,
has been discouraged."'
Essentially, the purpose of the hypothetical question is to disclose to the
jury all information upon which the expert will rely in forming his
opinion.' 2  This method of questioning aids in preventing any
misunderstanding by the jury. 3 Notwithstanding this meritorious objective,
the requirement does not always serve its purpose. 4 The hypothetical ques-
tion is often verbose, awkward, and complex.45 A major problem with the
hypothetical question is the selection of preliminary data which the question
must contain.' 6 On one hand, the question must provide the material facts
relevant to the formation of a rational expert opinion. 7 On the other hand,
it cannot include facts which have not been admitted into evidence. 8
Because of its problems and susceptibility to abuse by counsel, the
hypothetical question has been the target of much criticism.' 9
41. See Jamison v. Lambke, 21 Ill. App. 3d 629, 636, 316 N.E.2d 93, 98 (1st Dist. 1974)
(permitting an expert witness to answer hypothetical question based upon facts which have not
been previously adduced in evidence is not desirable and is strongly discouraged). Cf. Gibson
v. Healy Bros. & Co., 109 Ill. App. 2d 342, 352, 248 N.E.2d 771, 776 (1st Dist. 1969) (expert
allowed to give opinion based on facts not in evidence only upon representation that counsel
could adduce the missing evidence from subsequent witnesses).
42. WEINSTEIN, supra note 6, 705101], at 705-5. See, e.g., Wolczek v. Public Serv. Co.,
342 Ill. 482, 498, 174 N.E. 577, 584 (1930) (hypothetical question must contain all material
facts, otherwise expert's opinion is apt to be misleading); Hammond v. Bloomington Can Co.,
190 Il1. App. 511, 513 (3d Dist. 1914) (hypothetical question should contain all facts on which
the answer is based so that the jury may fully understand the bases for the expert's opinion).
McCormick notes that the hypothetical question is a logical device for assisting the jury in
applying the expert's knowledge to the case. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 16, at 36.
43. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 686, at 813.
44. See McElhaney, supra note 9, at 42; Ladd supra note 2, at 427.
45. See Ladd, supra note 2, at 426-27. Support for this statement can be seen in Borowski
v. Von Solbrig, 14 111. App. 3d 672, 303 N.E.2d 146 (1st Dist. 1973), aff'd, 60 Ill. 2d 418, 328
N.E.2d 310 (1975), where the hypothetical question propounded to the plaintiff's doctor was
76 pages in length. Objections and rulings were an additional 27 pages long. Id. at 687, 303
N.E.2d at 157.
46. 11 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 705.10, at VII-72 (2d ed. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as MOORE]. Moore notes that by dispensing with the requirement that an ex-
pert's opinion testimony be preceeded by a statement of facts which underlie it, Rule 705
should eliminate the troublesome aspect of the hypothetical question and open the way for ex-
pert testimony in a form which will better aid the trier of fact. Id.
47. See supra note 38. Although there is no requirement that all material facts in the case
be included in the hypothetical, Wirth v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 111. 2d 475, 480, 312 N.E.2d
593, 595 (1974), the court possesses discretion to require that additional facts be added to the
original question if it deems such facts essential to providing an adequate basis for a helpful
answer. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 14, at 34.
48. See supra note 40. See also Note, The Expert Witness and the Hypothetical Question,
13 CASE W. RES. 755, 756-57 (1962) (hypothetical question must be based on facts assumed to
be true, and those facts must be in record).
49. Judge Learned Hand described the hypothetical question as the "most horrific and
grotesque wen on the fair face of justice." MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 15, at 37 n.15 (citing
New York Bar Ass'n Lectures and Legal Topics (1921-22)). McCormick charges that the
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In contrast, Rule 705 permits an expert witness to give an opinion
without first disclosing the facts upon which his opinion is based. The rule
provides that "[tihe expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and
give his reasons thereof without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or
data unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may, in any event, be
required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination." 0
By eliminating the mandatory preliminary disclosure of the underlying
bases of an expert's opinion,5 1 Rule 705 represents an approach which was
first suggested by Wigmorel" and subsequently incorporated in the Model
Expert Testimony Act," the Model Code of Evidence, 54 and the Uniform
Rules of Evidence." The federal rule relies upon effective cross-examination
to reveal the factual basis of an expert's opinion.5" This in turn permits the
hypothetical question is a "failure in practice and an obstruction to the administration of
justice." Id. at 36. By permitting counsel to pick out those material facts he wants to include
in the question, the courts permit a one-sided hypothesis. On the other hand, if counsel is re-
quired to include all relevant facts, then an "intolerably wordy" question results. Id. Wigmore
noted:
Its abuses have become so obstructive and nauseous that no remedy short of ex-
tirpation will suffice. It is a logical necessity, but a practical incubus, and logic
here must be sacrificed. . . .It is a strange irony that the hypothetical question,
which is one of the truly scientific features of the rules of evidence, should have
become that feature which does most to disgust men of science with the law of
Evidence.
WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 686, at 812. See also Ladd, supra note 2, at 426-27 (hypothetical
question encourages partisan bias, affords an opportunity for summing up in the middle of
trial, and is complex and time consuming). In 1969, the Eighth Circuit praised the not yet
enacted Federal Rule as being designed "to remove stereotyped, long, belabored and nonsen-
sical hypothetical questions from the arena of the trial." Twin City Plaza, Inc. v. Central Sur.
& Ins. Corp., 409 F.2d 1195, 1201 (8th Cir. 1969).
50. FED. R. EvID. 705.
51. FED. R. EVID. 705 advisory committee note.
52. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 686.
53. MODEL EXPERT TESTIMONY ACT § 9 (1937). Section 9 provides:
(1) An expert witness may be asked to state his inferences, whether these inferences
are based on the witness' personal observation, or on evidence introduced at the
trial and seen or heard by the witness, or on his technical knowledge of the
subject, without first specifying hypothetically in the question the data on
which these inferences are based.
54. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 409 (1942). Rule 409 provides:
An expert witness may state his relevant inferences from matters perceived by him
or from evidence introduced at the trial and seen or heard by him or from his
special knowledge, skill, experience or training ...and he may state his reasons
for such inferences and need not, unless the judge so orders, first specify, as an
hypothesis or otherwise, the data which he draws them ....
55. UNIF. R. EVID. 58 (1953). Rule 58 states that "[q]uestions calling for the opinion of an
expert witness need not be hypothetical in form unless the judge in his discretion so requires,
but the witness may state his opinion and reasons therefore without first specifying data on
which it is based as a hypothesis or otherwise." Id.
56. See generally D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 399, at 703 (1979) (the
validity of this approach rests upon the notion that the price of requiring the foundation to be
laid first is simply too high). [hereinafter cited as LoUiSELL & MUELLER].
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trier of fact to assess credibility and to determine how much weight to ac-
cord the expert's testimony." As the federal rules advisory committee
noted, the rule is based upon the assumption that the cross-examining party
has the advance knowledge necessary to elicit disclosure of the underlying
factual bases on cross-examination."
Thus, Rule 705 simplifies the mode for eliciting an expert's opinion by
allowing the expert to state his opinion without first disclosing the bases
underlying that opinion. This rule, when combined with Rule 703, makes
the use of expert testimony more efficient. Through the adoption of Rules
703 and 705, the Illinois Supreme Court in Wilson v. Clark" abandoned the
common law limitations on expert testimony.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
John Wilson brought an action against Dr. David Clark on the basis of
alleged negligent medical treatment which resulted in the amputation of the
lower portion of Wilson's right leg. At trial, over plaintiff's objection, 60 the
court permitted defense counsel to place into evidence hospital records per-
taining to plaintiff's three hospital confinements.6 ' After submitting the
hospital records into evidence, defense counsel was permitted to instruct
defendant's expert witness to assume that the facts stated in the hospital
records were true. 62 The expert was asked to further assume additional facts
regarding plaintiff's treatment. 63 With this foundation, defense counsel was
57. See Twin City Plaza, Inc. v. Central Sur. & Ins. Corp., 409 F.2d 1195, 1200 (8th Cir.
1969) (facts which cast a doubt on the expert's conclusion are best brought out on cross-
examination to test the witness' credibility).
58. FED. R. EvID. 705 advisory committee note.
59. 84 II. 2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (1981).
60. Plaintiff argued that two procedural steps are necessary before hospital records are ad-
missible into evidence. First, the custodian of the records must verify that the records were
kept in the ordinary course of business and that they are in the same condition at trial as when
the entries were originally made. Second, the records must be verified through testimony of the
person who made the entries. While the plaintiff admittedly waived the first requirement, he
did not waive the second. 84 11. 2d at 191-92, 417 N.E.2d at 1325-26. Thus, the records were
admitted without the necessary foundation. Id.
61. Id. at 192, 417 N.E.2d at 1326. The hospital records contained 100 pages of technical
medical entries, including history sheets, temperature charts, medication charts, laboratory
reports, administration sheets, x-ray reports, progress reports, pathology reports, post-
anethesia reports, physician orders, and nurses' notes. Id.
62. The plaintiff objected to the hypothetical question based on the hospital records on two
grounds:
(1) the hospital records are inadmissible without a proper foundation, and
(2) the plaintiff would have no idea upon which facts contained in the hospital
record defendant's expert witness based his opinion. Since there had been no
evidence of the contents of the hospital records, it would be impossible to
cross-examine the expert upon which facts he relied.
Brief for Appellee at 96, Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill. 2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Brief for Appellee].
63. Defendant's counsel presented these additional facts in the hypothetical question:
I would ask you further assume three additional facts. That a surgical amputation
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permitted to elicit testimony concerning whether Dr. Clark exercised the
degree of knowledge and expertise expected of a certified orthopedic
surgeon in the same locality. 6 ' The jury returned a verdict for Dr. Clark
and Wilson appealed.
The Appellate Court for the Second District considered three of the ten
issues presented6 ' and reversed the trial court on the ground that the
defense failed to established the necessary foundation for the admission of
the hospital records into evidence." In so doing, the appellate court held
that the trial court should not have allowed the hypothetical question based
upon facts contained in those records.6" In support of its decision, the ap-
pellate court reasoned that allowing a hypothetical question based upon the
unspecified contents of Wilson's hospital records hampered his counsel's
cross-examination of defendant's expert witness," and permitted purely
was done to the lower right extremity of the hypothetical patient and at that time
marked arteriosclerosis was found at or about the amputation site, which is ap-
proximately three to four inches below the knee. Secondly, found at that time that
this hypothetical patient presented himself in the first occasion to another
hypothetical orthopedic surgeon by [the] name of Robbins in the year of 1974, the
month of March, that an opening in the front of the right tibia was dry and void
of discharge. Thirdly, I would ask that you assume that it was the opinion of the
hypothetical orthopedic surgeon by the name of Robbins in October 1st of 1974, if
he were permitted to freshen up the ends of the bone and place a small screw to
hold the bone in apposition that the condition of ill being then and there present in
John Wilson was going on to healing.
Brief for Appellee, supra note 62, at 97.
64. Brief for Appellee, supra note 62, at 97. The question posed by defense counsel was as
follows:
Q. And I will ask you now to assume all those facts to be true. Would you have
an opinion based on a reasonable degree of medical and surgical certainty as to
whether or not the hypothetical orthopedic surgeon, David Clark, exercised the
degree of skill, applied that degree of knowledge and expertise that a Board
Certified orthopedic surgeon should have applied to a patient in the County of
Kane and State of Illinois in the years 1972 and 1973? Do you have an
opinion?
A. I have.
Q. What is your opinion?
A. I feel that he did.
Id.
65. Wilson v. Clark, 80 IIl. App. 3d 194, 196-99, 399 N.E.2d 651, 653-55 (2d Dist. 1980).
The three issues considered were:
(1) Whether the trial court erred in allowing plaintiff's hospital records to be ad-
mitted into evidence without a proper foundation, and in permitting a
hypothetical question based upon those records.
(2) Whether the trial court erred in permitting use of a medical textbook without
first establishing its authoritativeness.
(3) Did the trial court erroneously permit admission of incompetent and prejudicial
testimony on the issue or contributory negligence?
Id.
66. Id. at 197, 399 N.E.2d at 653.
67. Id.
68. Id. As a corollary, it has been written that one should never cross-examine unless he
knows what the answer will be. See I. GOLDSTEIN, TRIAL TECHNIQUE § 559 (1935). Also, cross-
examining on alleged incompetent testimony can result in waiving the right to claim error on
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argumentative material to be placed before the jury. 9
THE WILSON DECISION
After dispensing with a number of unrelated issues,7" the Illinois Supreme
Court addressed the critical questions of whether the trial court erred in ad-
mitting the plaintiff's hospital records into evidence and subsequently per-
mitting the expert witness to express his opinion in response to a hypotheti-
cal question based on those records."1 Initially, the court recognized that a
proper foundation must be established before hospital records can be ad-
mitted into evidence. In view of this foundation requirement, the court
maintained that the plaintiff's records were admitted improperly.73 The
court, however, determined that even though hospital records require a suf-
ficient foundation before being admitted into evidence, a medical expert
may give an opinion based on hospital records not placed into evidence.74
In support of this proposition, the court cited People v. Ward.7" The
Ward court held that it was permissible for an expert witness to use medical
records in forming an opinion regarding an accused's sanity even though
the records were not placed into evidence. 6 Dispensing with the argument
that Ward was limited to "treating" physicians, and, thus, applicable only
to "treating" experts,77 the court noted that federal and state courts have
appeal. See, Campbell v. City of Marseilles, 5 I11. App. 2d 45, 52, 124 N.E.2d 677, 681 (2d
Dist. 1955) (party cannot seek reversal based on speculative medical testimony introduced
through party's own cross-examination).
69. 80 Ill. App. 3d at 197, 399 N.E.2d at 653. Cf. Borowski v. Von Solbrig, 14 11. App. 3d
672, 303 N.E.2d 146 (1st Dist. 1973) (substantial portion of hypothetical question was purely
argumentative material designed to persuade jury rather than statement of assumed fact from
which expert could form opinion), aff'd, 60 Ill. 2d 418, 426, 328 N.E.2d 301, 306 (1975).
70. The court dispensed with questions regarding post-trial motions, the denial of
plaintiff's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and jury instructions concerning
issues of willful and wanton conduct and contributory negligence. 84 II1. 2d at 189-91, 417
N.E.2d at 1324-25.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 192, 417 N.E.2d at 1326. Supreme Court Rule 236 provides that business records
shall be admitted into evidence without introducing all circumstances of their making. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. I I0A, 236(a) (1981). Rule 236(b), however, exempts hospital records from
subsection (a). Id. 236(b). Consequently, a proper foundation must be laid before hospital
records can be admitted into evidence. See Casey v. Penn, 45 11. App. 3d 573, 583, 360
N.E.2d 93, 100 (2d Dist. 1977) (admission of hospital records is allowed only where a proper
foundation has been laid).
73. 84 Ill. 2d at 192, 417 N.E.2d at 1326.
74. Id.
75. 61 Ill. 2d 559, 338 N.E.2d 171 (1975).
76. Id. at 568, 338 N.E.2d at 176. In formulating his opinion, the expert in Ward relied
upon data that was compiled by others. Although this data would normally be inadmissible
because it was compiled by persons who did not testify, the court held that the expert's opinion
could be based upon such data because it was of the type customarily relied upon by
psychiatrists when formulating an opinion on the sanity of a patient. Id.
77. In Ward, the testifying expert was also the treating doctor. Thus, he had firsthand
observation of the matter to which he testified. Illinois has traditionally recognized firsthand
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interpreted Federal Rule 703, upon which the Ward decision was based,"8 to
allow expert opinions based on facts not yet entered into evidence.7 9 Fur-
ther, neither these courts nor the federal rules have distinguished between
treating and non-treating experts.' Rather, as the Wilson court explained,
the key element in applying Federal Rule 703 is whether the information
upon which the expert bases his opinion is of a type that is reliable.'
In assessing reliability, the Wilson court focused on the policy considera-
tions underlying Federal Rule 703 and stated that it would be extremely
time consuming to establish the reliability of hospital records by calling into
court every person who made an entry in the records. 2 To support its posi-
tion the court referred to the advisory committee's note on Rule 703, which
provides that allowing expert opinions based on facts not in evidence pro-
motes judicial efficiency because counsel no longer has to produce and ex-
amine various authenticating witnesses. 3 The court further reasoned that a
physician's validation of the hospital records, expertly performed and sub-
ject to cross-examination, was sufficiently reliable for judicial purposes.14 In
adopting Rule 703, the Wilson court held that due to the high degree of
reliability of hospital records, an expert may offer an opinion in response to
a hypothetical question based on facts contained in those records, even if
the hospital records themselves are not admitted into evidence.8
observation as a source upon which the expert testimony can rest. See infra note 94. The
Wilson court pointed out, however, that the advisory committee's note to Rule 703 makes it
clear that an expert can base his opinion on data presented to him outside of court by means
other than his own perception. Thus, a distinction between treating and nontreating experts is
unnecessary under Rule 703.
78. The Ward court quoted Rule 703 and its commentary with approval. 61 111. 2d at 567,
338 N.E.2d at 176. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., United States v. Genser, 582 F.2d 292, 298 (3d Cir. 1978) (IRS agent allowed
to testify to results of audit which was not introduced into evidence); Bryan v. John Bean Div.
of FMC Corp., 566 F.2d 541, 545 (5th Cir. 1978) (modern view in evidence law recognizes that
experts often rely on facts or data supplied by third party not in evidence); United States v.
Sims, 514 F.2d 147, 149 (9th Cir. 1975) (psychiatric testimony concerning sanity of accused,
based in part on conversation with IRS agent not in evidence, permitted); State v. Clark, 112
Ariz. 493, 496, 543 P.2d 1122, 1125 (1975) (no error in admitting opinion of psychiatrist which
was based in part on medical records not in evidence); State v. Pendry, 227 S.E.2d 210, 215
(W. Va. 1976) (doctor permitted to form opinion based on staff report compiled by others
without report being offered into evidence).
80. 84 I11. 2d at 193, 417 N.E.2d at 1326. Thus, the Wilson court rejected the plaintiff's
argument that Ward was distinguishable on the basis that in Ward, the testifying expert was
also the treating doctor, 61 111. 2d at 563, 338 N.E.2d at 175, whereas in Wilson, the expert
was not a treating doctor.
81. 84 111. 2d at 193, 417 N.E.2d at 1326. Rule 703 provides, in part: "[ijf of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon
the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence." FEo. R. EvID. 703 (emphasis
added).
82. 84 111. 2d at 194, 417 N.E.2d at 1326.
83. Id.
84. Id. (quoting FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee note). See also McCoRMICK, supra
note 3, § 15, at 36.
85. 84 Ill. 2d at 196, 417 N.E.2d at 1326.
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Recognizing a modern trend that has liberalized certain trial procedures, 6
the court also adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 705. Rule 705 allows an
expert to give an opinion without disclosing the facts underlying that opinion.'
Although the court recognized that the burden is on the adverse party to elicit,
during cross-examination, facts underlying the expert's opinion," it main-
tained that this burden is not onerous in light of Illinois' extensive pretrial
discovery procedures.' 9
The Wilson decision acknowleged the desirability of adopting Rules 703
and 705 to eliminate the time-consuming process of posing long
hypothetical questions. Yet, the court determined that it would be unfair to
apply these rules to the plaintiff in Wilson. 90 The court reasoned that at the
time of the trial the plaintiff had no notice that a nontreating expert's opin-
ion in response to a hypothetical question could be based on records not in
evidence.91 Stating that the plaintiff did not have to risk waiving his valid
objection to those records for the purposes of appeal, the court held that
the allowance of a hypothetical question based on hospital records im-
properly admitted into evidence in the instant case constituted reversible er-
86. The Wilson court stated that 18 states (Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
Delaware, Florida, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) have adopted
Federal Rule 703 verbatim, or with minor changes. The court also noted that 17 states,
(Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming),
have adopted Rule 705. The court further recognized that California, Kansas, and New Jersey
have adopted similar provisions. Id. at 195, 417 N.E.2d at 1327.
It should be noted that Florida and Maine have made substantive changes in their adoption
of Rule 705. Florida's rule provides:
Prior to the witness giving his opinion, a party against whom the opinion or in-
ference is offered may conduct a voir dire examination of the witness directed to
the underlying facts or data for his opinion. If the party establishes prima facie
evidence that the expert does not have a sufficient basis for his opinion, the opinions
and inferences of the expert are inadmissible unless the party offering the
testimony first establishes the underlying facts or data.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.705(2) (West 1978). Maine has adopted a similar provision. See ME. CT. R.
EvID. 705.
87. FED. R. EviD. 705.
88. See Bryan v. John Bean Div. of FMC Corp., 566 F.2d 541, 545 (5th Cir. 1978) (Rule
705 eliminates the need for elaborate disclosures of the bases of expert opinion by placing the
onus of eliciting the bases of the opinion on the cross-examiner).
89. 84 11. 2d at 194, 417 N.E.2d at 1327. The Illinois statute allowing discovery provides in
pertinent part:
A party shall not be required to furnish the names and addresses of witnesses, ex-
cept that upon motion of any party disclosure of the identity of expert witnesses
shall be made to all parties and the court in sufficient time in advance of trial so as
to insure a fair and equitable preparation of the case by all parties.
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, § 58(3) (1981) (emphasis added).
90. 84 111. 2d at 195, 417 N.E.2d at 1327.
91. Id.
Vol. 31:387
1982] WILSON v. CLARK 401
ror.' 2 The court concluded, however, that Federal Rules of Evidence 703
and 705 would apply to future cases. 9
ANALYSIS AND IMPACT OF WILSON
Traditionally, Illinois has recognized firsthand observation," the hypo-
thetical question,' and trial observation 6 as sources of information upon
which an expert's opinion may legitimately rest. Thus, the Wilson court's
acceptance of Rule 703 merely reflects the existing practice in Illinois with
regard to these sources.
Until Wilson, however, Illinois law was unclear on whether experts from
fields other than the medical profession could form their opinions by rely-
ing upon information made known to them outside of court and by means
other than their own perception. 7 The adoption of Rule 703 by the Wilson
court eliminates any question concerning the applicability of the Ward deci-
sion to non-medical testimony." Under the new rules adopted in Wilson,
92. Id. at 195-96, 417 N.E.2d at 1327.
93. Id. The change in Illinois law applies only to cases in which the initial complaints are
filed on or after the date of the opinion, or in which trial commenced on or after September 1,
1981. Id.
94. See, e.g., Spence v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 34 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1071, 340
N.E.2d 550, 559 (lst Dist. 1975) (where an expert witness has knowledge of the facts based on
his personal observation, there is no need for a hypothetical question); Skalon v. Manning,
Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 127 Ill. App. 2d 145, 161, 262 N.E.2d 146, 154 (1st Dist. 1970) (ex-
pert may base his opinion on firsthand observation of facts or data perceived by him before
trial); Sherman v. City of Springfield, 77 Ill. App. 2d 195, 204, 222 N.E.2d 62, 67 (4th Dist.
1966) (a treating physician may render an opinion based upon medical examination conducted
prior to trial); Krueger v. Friel, 330 Il. App. 557, 568, 71 N.E.2d 815, 820 (1st Dist. 1947)
(when opinion is based on personal observation, hypothetical question is not required).
95. See Keystone Steel & Wire Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 42 Il. 2d 273, 277, 246 N.E.2d
228, 231 (1969). For a general statement of Illinois' view on the function of the hypothetical
question, see Johns-Manville Prod. Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 78 Ill. 2d 171, 399 N.E.2d 606
(1979).
96. See People v. Covey, 34 Ill. 2d 195, 198, 215 N.E.2d 220, 222 (1966) (expert may give
opinion based upon evidence produced by other witness). Although Illinois allows an expert to
use trial observation as a source of facts or data for his opinion, the use of this method is or-
dinarily confined to testimony that is undisputed. See Maton Bros. v. Central Ill. Pub. Serv.
Co., 356 Ill. 584, 586, 191 N.E. 321, 326 (1934) (expert cannot invade province of jury by
weighing evidence at trial and expressing an opinion on a contested issue); Graham v. St.
Luke's Hosp., 46 111. App. 2d 147, 155, 196 N.E.2d 355, 359 (1st Dist. 1964) (witness cannot
be asked for opinion based on conflicting evidence).
97. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
98. Although the Ward decision may be construed as being limited to expert medical
testimony, the principles stated in Rule 703 are generally held applicable to any field of exper-
tise. See, e.g., United States v. Hollman, 541 F.2d 196, 200-01 (8th Cir. 1976) (expert's opinion
that substance was heroin, based on lab comparison with substance given to him as heroin, is
admissible); United States v. Morrison, 531 F.2d 1089, 1094-95 (1st Cir.) (FBI gambling expert
allowed to testify as to results of lab analysis of betting slips and records seized from gambling
operation to determine the monetary extent of the operation even though he did not perform
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both medical and non-medical expert witnesses may rely on non-evidentiary
data in arriving at their opinions.9 9 This procedure will save time by
eliminating the necessity of bringing forth witnesses whose sole function at
trial is to construct a proper foundation for the expert's opinion. '
Moreover, the adoption of the rule will conform the judicial practice to the
daily practice of experts outside the court room' 0 1 by allowing an expert to
base his opinion on the same information on which he normally relies in his
daily work. Consequently, the expert will deliver more complete and ac-
curate testimony to the trier of fact because the bases upon which he may
rely in forming an opinion are not limited by technical rules.' 2
The Wilson court's adoption of Rule 703 expands the permissible bases
upon which an expert may rely in formulating an opinion. This expansion is
complimented by the court's additional adoption of Rule 705, which per-
mits greater flexibility in the presentation of expert testimony. The adoption
of Rule 705 represents a major revision in Illinois evidence law. Prior to the
Wilson decision, if an expert did not testify from personal knowledge, a
hypothetical question was required to elicit his opinion.' 3 The question was
used to introduce the underlying facts relied upon by the expert before ask-
ing him to state his conclusions.' 0' Rule 705, however, eliminates man-
datory preliminary disclosure of the underlying bases of expert testimony,""3
the calcuations), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 837 (1976); Elgi Holding, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.,
511 F.2d 957, 959 (2d Cir. 1975) (opinion that arson had occurred could be based on an unin-
troduced lab report).
99. One commentator has questioned how the unique status of the medical expert justifies
the granting of such a broad license to other types of experts. See Gibbons, supra note 19, at
226. Gibbons also questioned why a Supreme Court Advisory Committee would rely upon
decisions and empirical data relating to medical experts to establish new rules of evidence at
the very time that the stated goal of the Chief Justice was to exclude from the federal courts
most of the litigation in which medical experts would testify. Id.
100. As one commentator noted: "The emphasis can be on choosing witnesses who are
needed to explain things satisfactorily to the jury's understanding, rather than on parading
witness after witness to lay a complex foundation for a simple opinion .... Thus, Rule 703
creates a revolution in the logistics of expert testimony." McElhaney, supra note 9, at 482.
101. The purpose in broadening the bases for an expert opinion was to bring the judicial
practice into comformity with the practice of experts when not in court. FED. R. EVID. 703 ad-
visory committee note. The advisory committee used the example of a physician who makes
life and death decisions based upon information including statements by patients, hospital
records, etc. Id.
102. The adoption of the rule recognizes that "the opinion of an expert witness must in-
variably rest, at least in part, upon sources that can never be proven in court. An expert's opinion is
derived not only from records and data, but from education and a lifetime of experience."
United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954
(1972). A mere recounting of details will not always be sufficient to accurately convey the total
impression received by the witness. The adoption of the rule will allow an expert to use factors
in forming his opinion which will make that opinion more complete, because he will not be
limited solely to facts that are admissible into evidence. This emphasis on furnishing the trier
of fact with usable data will greatly enhance the fact finding process.
103. See supra notes 38-40.
104. See supra note 35.
105. See FED. R. EvID. 705 advisory committee note. An expert is still required to state the
reasons for his opinion, but a foundation of underlying data is unnecessary. Id.
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and, thus, eradicates the required use of the hypothetical question. Because
most litigators will not merely qualify an expert and obtain an opinion
without disclosing at least some of the facts or data upon which the opinion
is based,10 6 however, the real advantage of Rule 705 is that it permits the
streamlining of hypothetical questions, which will allow the expert to reach
the central part of his testimony quickly and directly.' 0 As long as the
question is not misleading, an examiner can now be far more selective in
determining the contents of hypothetical questions.
Although the adoption of Rule 705 does not abolish the use of the
hypothetical question,' 8 it will clearly curtail its use. Nonetheless, a court
may still, in its discretion, require the use of the hypothetical question to
elicit the expert's opinion. 09 Unless the court explicitly requires the use of
the hypothetical question, however, its use will be optional for counsel." '0
106. Direct testimony in the form of a bare opinion, without disclosure of facts and data
underlying that opinion, often appears shallow. P. ROTHSTEIN, RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE
UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as ROTHSTEIN]. One
commentator has noted that in a practical sense, a litigant's right to introduce an opinion into
evidence without prior disclosure of the underlying data may not result in any significant
change beyond doing away with disputes as to whether a sufficient foundation has been laid.
Gibbons, supra note 19, at 229.
107. For example, in a suit for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident, one
may envision the interrogation of the physician, once he has been qualified as an expert, to
proceed as follows:
Q. Dr. Willis-I take it you are a medical doctor, is that correct?
A. Yes I am. I specialize in the field of neurology, which is treatment of disorders
of the brain and neryous system.
Q. Are you familiar with the medical condition of Mr. Jon Price?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. Would you tell us about it, please.
A. Certainly. Jon Price hit his head on the side post of an automobile in which he
was riding on January 5, 1976. That blow to the head caused a tear in the
tissue of his brain, which formed a small scar as it healed. Because of that scar
on his brain, he has a form of epilepsy. At times which cannot be predicted, his
left hand and arm twitch and jerk uncontrollably. Unfortunately, there is no
way to operate on his injury, and in his case, medication has been ineffective.
Q. Can you tell us, Doctor, how long this condition will last?
A. I am afraid it will be with him the rest of his life.
Q. Thank you, Doctor, no further questions.
McElhaney, supra note 9, at 478.
108. See MOORE, supra note 46, § 705.10, at VII-71 to 73 (2d ed. 1976); WEINSTEIN, supra
note 6, 1 705[10], at 705-06. In some instances, the hypothetical question may prove useful.
The New Jersey Comnittee on Evidence, which proposed a rule similar to Rule 705, wrote:
[T]he hypothetical question still retains its usefulness in a case where, for example,
the "super-expert" applies his specialized learning to testimony in a case where he
had no personal contact whatever either with the persons or the matter involved in
the litigation, or in a case where there is a dispute as to the basic facts and a ques-
tion should be presented hypothetically as to an alternative set of facts.
WEINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 705-11 (quoting New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on
Evidence at 113 (1963)).
109. The advisory committee note provides for "the discretionary power of the judge to re-
quire preliminary disclosure in any event." FED. R. EvID. 705 advisory committee note.
110. It has been argued that litigators who have learned to use hypothetical questions effec-
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In addition to the diminishing effect Rule 705 will have on the use of
hypothetical questions, its adoption is likely to have a significant impact on
Illinois litigation in at least two other areas. First, with the elimination of
the requirement of prior disclosure of facts or data underlying the expert's
opinion, a new emphasis will be placed on the function of cross-
examination.1"' The justification for allowing an expert to give an opinion
without prior disclosure of the underlying bases is that cross-examination
suffices as a means of exposing whatever weaknesses exist in the testimony
of the expert."' Illinois traditionally has permitted great latitude in the
cross-examination of expert witnesses." 3 This flexibility, coupled with the
cross-examiner's ability to elicit the unfavorable facts underlying the
expert's opinion,"' will allow the skillful cross-examiner to refute poorly
founded testimony.
Because the effective cross-examination of an expert witness requires
thorough preparation, pretrial discovery also will be affected by the Wilson
decision. A lawyer, even with the help of experts, cannot realistically an-
ticipate the facts or data upon which his opponent's expert will rely in for-
ming an opinion. By shifting the burden of revealing the facts underlying
the expert's opinion to the cross-examining party, Illinois' adoption of Rule
705 is likely to result in more extensive pretrial discovery.", Thus, the
adoption of Rule 705 will require the trial counsel to obtain advance
knowledge of any information necessary for the effective cross-examination
of the opponent's expert witness." 6 As the Wilson court correctly noted,
because Illinois' extensive pretrial discovery procedures are liberal,'' 7 the
tively will still use them, and thus, Rule 705 will not get the attention it deserves. See
McElhaney, supra note 9, at 488.
Il1. See generally LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 56, § 399, at 703; WEINSTEIN, supra
note 6, 705[011, at 705-08. Thus, Rule 705 will have substantial impact on trial preparation,
at least in the case of some lawyers who, in an effort to conserve resources, rely to a con-
siderable extent on information they obtain from opposing experts on direct. Because Rule 705
allows the expert to state his opinion without disclosing the underlying facts or data, the cross-
examiner who is not prepared may find himself in a dilemma after the direct exam. ROTH-
STEIN, supra note 106, at 291.
112. See FED. R. EvID. 705 advisory committee note. In anticipation of criticism, the ad-
visory committee stated that "if the objection is made that leaving it to the cross-examiner to
bring out the supporting data is essentially unfair, the answer is that he is under no compulsion
to bring out any facts or data except those unfavorable to the opinion."Id.
113. See Muscarello v. Peterson, 20 Ill. 2d 548, 554, 170 N.E.2d 564, 568 (1960) ("[glreat
latitude is . . . allowed in the cross-examination of an expert"). Accord Horwitz v. Michael
Reese Hosp., 5 Il. App. 3d 508, 284 N.E.2d 4 (1st Dist. 1970) (cross-examination of specialist
proper under the broad rule announced in Muscarello v. Peterson).
114. See FED. R. EvID. 705 advisory committee note.
115. McElhaney notes that Rules 703 and 705 contemplate that trial lawyers will ascertain
the bases for expert opinions prior to trial by using ordinary means of discovery. McElhaney,
supra note 9, at 489. See also, ROTHSTEIN, supra note 106, at 293.
116. See FED. R. EvID. 705 advisory committee note.
117. See supra note 92. This provision brings the civil practice into line with the Supreme
Court Rules regulating discovery in criminal cases. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1IOA § 412(a)(i), (iv)
(1981). These sections provide for discovery of expert witnesses, their reports and tests, and the
substance of their statements. Spector, supra note 5, at 304 n.76.
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opposing party's burden of obtaining the facts underlying the expert's opi-
nion will not be excessive."'
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS RESULTING FROM
THE ADOPTION OF RULES 703 AND 705
With the adoption of Federal Rules of Evidence 703 and 705, Illinois has
relaxed its previous limitations on the use of expert testimony. Although the
Wilson decision is likely to have a positive impact on expert testimony in Il-
linois, the adoption of Rules 703 and 705 may precipitate negative ramifica-
tions that will hinder effective operation of the rules.
Under Rule 703, an expert may rely on facts or data that are inadmissible
at trial as the basis for his opinion.'" The only limitation on this rule is
that the information be "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field in forming opinions or inferences."' 2 Other jurisdictions in-
terpreting this rule have had difficulty determining whether the expert's
reliance on inadmissible information was "reasonable".' 2 ' The question
that must be resolved is whether the expert or the judge should decide what
is reasonably reliable in the field.' 2 Underlying Rule 703 is the idea that the
expert, rather than the court, better understands the nature and quality of
data essential to support an opinion in his or her own field.'2 3 Consequent-
ly, it has been suggested that considerable weight should be given to any
assurance by the expert that the underlying data is reliable.'2
118. 84 I11. 2d at 194, 417 N.E.2d at 1327. See FED. R. EvID. 705, advisory committee note;
WEINSTEIN, supra note 6, 705[01], at 705-9. Although complete discovery may be sufficient
for obtaining advance knowledge of information necessary for effective cross-examination, the
increased use of pretrial discovery may be disadvantageous because one undeniable fact of ex-
haustive discovery is that it creates considerable delay. See Ehrenbrand, Cutting Discovery
Costs Through Interrogatories and Document Requests, 1 LITIGATION 17 (No. 2 1975).
119. FED. R. EVID. 703.
120. Id.
121. Compare United States v. Genser, 582 F.2d 292, 298 (3d Cir. 1978) (IRS agent's
reliance on audit reasonable); Frazier v. Continental Oil Co., 568 F.2d 378, 383 (5th Cir. 1978)
(expert's reliance on National Fire Protection Code reasonable when test testifying to proper
design of vent systems for underground gasoline tanks) with Merit Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler
Corp., 569 F.2d 666, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (economics expert's reliance on theories of elasticity
of demand in various markets unreasonable).
122. See McElhaney, supra note 9, at 483-86. McElhaney notes that the standards of
reliability in any particular field must take into account the special situation in which it arises.
A doctor making an emergency diagnosis at the scene of an accident will not use the same
standards of reliability as he would in the research lab. Trials are supposed to provide an op-
portunity for calm deliberation, appropriately taking longer to review events than the events
themselves may have taken to transpire. Thus, a judge should look to the expert's field for
guidance, but not for his ultimate decision. Id.
123. See LOUISELL &: MUELLER, supra note 56, § 387, at 652-53.
124. See United States v. Sims, 514 F.2d 147, 149 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 845
(1975). The Sims court noted that
[blecause of [the expert's] professional background, knowledge, and experience, we
should, in circumstances such as these, leave to the expert the assessment of the
reliability of the statements on which he bases his expert opinion. . . .Years of
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The rule does not, however, abdicate judicial responsibility to the expert.
The trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, ultimately must determine
whether the expert's sources of information are sufficiently reliable to war-
rant the admission of the expert's opinion.' 5 In determining whether the
data underlying the expert's opinion is "of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the field," the court should consider: (1) the importance of the
issue; (2) the extent to which the opinion relies on material not offered in
evidence; (3) the impression the opinion will have on the jury; and (4) the
availability of the out-of-court material on which the expert relies in form-
ing the opinion."2 6 Although the court should defer to the expert's field for
guidance, the final decision as to admissibility lies with the court.'27
While Rule 703 defines the sources from which experts may derive facts
and data that serve as the bases for their opinions, the Wilson court's adop-
tion of Rule 705 permits an expert to give his opinion without disclosing
these underlying bases. 2 This practice has been criticized on the ground
that the trier of fact is more likely to hear an opinion which is inadmissible
because the inadequate underlying data will not be brought out until cross-
examination. "9 Even if the court instructs the jury to disregard the opinion,
the jury is still prejudiced by having heard the damaging expert
testimony.13°
experience teach the expert to separate the wheat from the chaff and to use only
those sources and kinds of information which are a type reasonably relied upon by
similar experts in arriving at sound opinions on the subject.
See also United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir. 1971) (expert is competent to
judge the reliability of records and statements on which opinion is based because of profes-
sional knowledge and ability), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954 (1972).
125. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1957) (determina-
tion of reasonable reliance lies within domain of trial judge's authority), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
975 (1958). This follows from the trial court's power to determine the ultimate admissibility of
evidence. WEINSTEIN, supra note 6, 703[021, at 703-15. A part of this determination is con-
cerned with whether the expert himself and others in the field would actually rely on such data
"for purposes other than testifying in a lawsuit." Id.
126. J. COTCHETT & A. ELKIND, FEDERAL COURTROOM EVIDENCE 116 (1976).
127. Professor McElhaney gives this hypothetical example of an appropriate court ruling
concerning whether the expert's sources are sufficiently reliable to render his opinion admissi-
ble:
Certainly I must decide the foundational question under Rule 104(a). What I am to
decide is not whether I think it is reasonable to rely on such information, but
whether I find the profession in question thinks it's reasonable to do so. While I
would not personally rely on this information, the Federal Rules defer to the stan-
dards of the profession of the expert witness, outside the gross extremes, which are
not presented here. Any objection to the basis for this expert opinion may be
shown on cross-examination, and goes to the weight the jury should give the opinion,
but does not affect its admissibility. The evidence is admitted.
McElhaney, supra note 9, at 486. See supra note 125.
128. FED. R. EviO. 705.
129. McElhaney, supra note 9, at 486.
130. McElhaney remarks that "itlelling the jury to disregard something they have just heard
is about as effective as telling someone not to think of pink elephants." McElhaney, supra
note 9, at 487 n.97.
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It is possible, however, to reduce the likelihood of exposing the trier of
fact to an inadmissible opinion. If an opposing party believes that the
witness lacks an adequate basis for his opinion, he may request the court to
permit a voir dire examination of the expert outside the presence of the
jury.' 3 ' Voir dire is a useful device because it is far more effective to refute
the foundation of an expert witness, thus preventing the opinion from being
heard by the jury, than to allow the jury to hear the testimony and attempt
to undercut it during cross examination.' 32
Although some states expressly authorize voir dire examinations,' 33 Il-
linois does not allow them as a matter of right.'"" Rather, voir dire ex-
amination lies within the court's discretion. The adoption by Illinois of an
express provision permitting voir dire examinations of expert witnesses
would ensure opposing counsel the opportunity to demonstrate to the court
the inadmissibility of the expert's opinion outside the presence of the jury.
In instances where pretrial discovery indicates that the witness does not
have a sufficient basis for his opinion, a motion in limine'35 may be utilized
to keep an inadmissible opinion from the jury. Under this procedure, a rul-
ing will be made on the admissibility of the opinion before it is introduced
at trial. If the data upon which the expert relied in forming his opinion is
not of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field, the court may
limit or prohibit testimony on such matters. Motions in limine are likely to
minimize juror prejudice because the jury will be precluded from hearing
inadmissible expert opinions if the motion is granted.
An additional consideration raised by Rule 705 is whether inadmissible
facts or data underlying an expert's opinion become admissible upon
disclosure of the expert's opinion, or whether the rule, like Rule 703, af-
fects only the admissibility of the opinion itself.'36 This distinction is impor-
tant in a situation where the basis of the expert's opinion is primarily hear-
131. See People v. Sawhill, 299 Ill. 393, 408-09, 132 N.E. 477, 483 (1921) (opposing counsel
should be permitted to examine witness to determine whether witness is competent to testify);
Geving v. Fitzpatrick, 56 Ill. App. 3d 206, 211, 371 N.E.2d 1228, 1233 (4th Dist. 1978)
(establishing qualifications of witness as an expert, as well as preliminary cross-examination,
should be allowed before expert gives opinion to jury).
132. McElhaney, supra note 9, at 476.
133. See supra note 86.
134. Payne v. Murphy Hardware Co., 62 Ill. App. 3d 803, 805, 379 N.E.2d 817, 819 (2d
Dist. 1978) (although allowing preliminary cross-examination going to the qualifications of the
expert witness will further objective of affording everyone a fair trial, it is not necessarily a
right in all cases).
135. A motion in limine is a request for a ruling on the admissibility of certain evidence
made at any time prior to the offer of that evidence at trial. See, e.g., Reidelberger v.
Highland Body Shop, Inc., 83 II1. 2d 545, 549, 416 N.E.2d 268, 271 (1981) (motion in limine
will protect moving party from whatever prejudicial impact the mere asking of the questions
and the making of objections will have on the jury); Department of Pub. Works & Bldg. v.
Sun Oil Co., 66 Ill. App. 3d 64, 67, 383 N.E.2d 634, 636 (5th Dist. 1978) (use of such a mo-
tion enables a party to prevent opponent beforehand from attempting to prejudice the jury by
offering evidence that the opponent knows should be excluded or stricken upon objection).
136. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 106, at 277.
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say and the judge, in his discretion, requires disclosure of the underlying
facts or data."' The question then becomes whether the bases of the opi-
nion will be admitted into evidence.
Unfortunately, the advisory committee note does not suggest an answer.
It can reasonably be argued, however, that although the trial judge operates
within a wide range of discretion, he cannot require disclosure of evidence
that is inadmissible in open court, even if it seems desirable to elicit the
bases for the expert's opinion. Otherwise a skillful attorney would be able
to use his expert to bring facts into evidence which normally would not be
allowed in open court.
CONCLUSION
The Wilson court's adoption of Federal Rules of Evidence 703 and 705
provides a welcome change to the prior limitations imposed on the use of
expert testimony in Illinois. With this expansion of the sources from which
an expert may rely in drawing facts and data to form his opinion, the
judicial practice is brought into conformity with the practice of the experts
themselves. The desirability of this result stems from the fact that an ex-
pert's opinion is not only derived from records and data, but also from
years of education and a lifetime of experiences.
Furthermore, broadening the permissible foundation for an expert opi-
nion, when combined with the relaxed requirements for disclosure of facts
underlying the expert's testimony, substantially reduces the need for the use
of hypothetical questions. The hypothetical question has proven to be an
awkward method of eliciting an expert's opinion, as well as a device subject
to abuse.' 38 The trier of fact will benefit by being informed as to the
expert's perception of the relevant facts rather than confining the bases of
the expert's opinion to select assumptions proposed by the attorneys. This,
in turn, should present a more accurate picture to the trier of fact.
Moreover, the adoption of these rules will promote judicial efficiency by
eliminating the need for a large number of witnesses who generally appear
in court solely to present data to the trier of fact in preparation for the ex-
pert's opinion.
Although the requisites for submitting expert testimony into evidence
have been relaxed, the burden on cross-examiners has been increased cor-
respondingly. Additionally, a more extensive pre-trial discovery is now re-
quired if counsel is to assess the propriety of the opposition's expert
testimony. Despite these new considerations, the Illinois Supreme Court's
decision in Wilson v. Clark has embraced a more practical and efficient ap-
proach for the use of expert testimony.
Roland P. Ernst
137. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
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